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Deconstructing the Intercultural Learning of a Doctoral
Group Undertaking Qualitative Research—Or How
Not to Do a ‘White PhD’
Ian Stronach, Jo Frankham, Sajida Bibi-Nawaz, Vanessa Cui,
Greg Cahill, Katy Dymoke, Dung Mai, Hafisan Mat-Som,
Khalid Khalid, Othman Alshareif, and Nasra Abrawi
Abstract This article looks at the intellectual and linguistic dilemmas of an
international doctoral group and juxtaposes these with some of the exis-
tential challenges the group faces. The intention is to offer a kind of ‘dia-
lectical tacking’ between doctoral thinking and doctoral experiences more
broadly. The overall aim of the piece is to think in front of each other while
developing a sense of ‘equality’ in relation to group contributions. Each
of the excursions into research in this article enacts different approaches
to research thinking – comparative, inductive, deductive, dialectical and
deconstructive. In this piece, the voices of the tutors (Stronach and
Frankham) are mostly dominant, but further publication will shift that
balance signiﬁcantly towards the voice of the doctoral student. We begin
with an empirical detail that highlights the nature of some of the problems
of cultural and linguistic translation.
Keywords: doctoral study, international students, intercultural learning,
UK higher education
Miss-translations, and the Life of ‘Thi’
Dung explained how ‘Thi’ in a Vietnamese name indicated ‘woman’. It appeared in
the middle of the name. Thus, in contemporary usage: ‘family name, ‘‘Thi’’, middle
name, ﬁrst name’. So how would we go about translating ‘Thi’ into English, just to
kick off our consideration of intercultural difﬁculties? English language markers of
‘woman’ in a name depend mainly on preﬁxes such as ‘Miss’, ‘Mrs’, or more recently
‘Ms’. But there’s a politics behind these female markers. ‘Miss’ can mean ‘young’, but
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sometimes ‘old’ as in an unmarried spinster. Either way, there’s usually something
belittling, literally or metaphorically, about the use. I say ‘usually’ because male senior
consultants in a UK hospital are not called ‘doctor’ but ‘Mr’, a mark of higher status.
I learned recently that their female equivalent can be ‘Miss’. So ‘Miss’ is a bit of
a semantic wanderer. High status, low status, no status. OK, so how about some-
thing more deﬁnite like ‘Mrs’? O dear, worse and worse. ‘Mrs’ marks the married
status of a woman. Until the 1950s, or thereabouts, one of its uses was incredibly
gendered – my mum would get letters addressed to ‘Mrs Peter Stronach’. As a little
kid, I remember puzzling over how she could possibly be called ‘Peter’ – we’re in
‘A boy called Sue’ territory here (Cash, 1969). So what ‘Mrs’ meant was a married
woman belonging to the man called whatever. Not a person, not part of a name
like ‘Thi’, but a possession. This reﬂected a historical subordination of women
to men in UK culture. Hence the coining of a new naming device in the 1960s
and ’70s: ‘Ms’, meaning a person in their own right, not to be labelled married/
unmarried. ‘Ms’ is a feminist invention, an ‘insurrectionary force’ (Fraser, 2013, p. 1)
against the patriarchy of female-naming in the UK and elsewhere.
So what’s in a name? A whole hidden politics of gender, in the case of the English
words for naming ‘woman’. Now, Dung wasn’t there to unpack ‘Thi’ for us – she’d
just written something for us and headed off to do ﬁeldwork in Vietnam – but we can
see that the idea of a straightforward translation into an English word is impossible.
Precise deﬁnition is not the solution, it is part of the problem.
When Dung returned she added to the mystery of ‘translation’ at our next
meeting: ‘Thi’ meant female and could apply to any age or marital state. There was
no equivalent male marker, so ‘Thi’ in a name meant woman as a presence, just as its
absence from a name implied a male. We wondered if that was also connected to
notions of patriarchy. Woman was the exception that had to be named, perhaps
a little like the kind of patriarchy that used to obtain in English where ‘man’ meant
male but also all of humankind, including women.1 What became apparent was that
Vietnamese had a great number of age- and status-type preﬁxes. They meant things
like ‘Sister’, ‘Aunt’, ‘Grandfather’ and so on. Nasra also added to this, saying the Mr/
Mrs/Ms boxes on UK government forms were culturally strange. They had no such
gender labels to preﬁx names in Oman.
At any rate, it seemed that ‘Thi’ was untranslatable, and the six different ethni-
cities in the meeting agreed that was the case for them all. Each word-marker in each
language was a mini-ideology of cultural difference. Thinking in another language
was like walking through a mineﬁeld: Small things had big consequences. A further
point of relevance. This section could not have been written by any single member of
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the group. We had to pool our information about Mr/Mrs/Ms/Thi to compare and
analyse the different cultural and language translations. Knowledge of these differ-
ences was the only possible basis for a common understanding. There was a certain
dependence on each other and a necessary equality in that process of exchange –
a theme we will return to. That was difﬁcult, but it had the bonus that we could get
further together than we could apart. It was an inversion of the notion of ‘together
apart’ (Derrida, 1991). All group members were ‘apart together’. Jointly, as Rancie`re
(1991) puts it, ‘the problem is to reveal an intelligence to itself’ (p. 28). And that
‘singular’ intelligence turns out to be necessarily collective.
We now shift from that illustration of the semantic dilemmas of translation to
a more experiential aspect of intercultural dilemmas.
Being Friendly, or Very Rude: Mark My Words!
At another of the doctoral group meetings, a student responds to an early draft of this
paper: ‘One more thing, in Vietnam, saying out the name of an older people or name
of teachers, professors . . . is rude. I am not allowed to say ‘‘Mark’’, instead, saying
‘‘Professor’’ ’. That’s very important. We saw a whole politics hiding within apparently
everyday labels for women, in English and in Vietnamese, and now we can see (or
begin to suspect) more overtly a politics of learning. Behind the ‘Mr’ or the ‘Professor’
is a whole range of understandings and feelings. On the one hand, we saw from an
Asian perspective notions such as respect, love, maybe a kind of Confucian ‘ﬁlial
piety’, as someone else wrote. Or the ‘priority’ for ‘modesty and politeness’. And also
the imperative to be ‘respectful’. On the other – more Western – reading, these
virtues may translate into deference, hierarchy, an acknowledgement of inferiority,
dependence. There are two very different ‘learners’ in the room! I (Ian Stronach)2 can
only pick up theWestern thread of this (if ‘Western’ is a sensible generalisation – but
it’ll do as shorthand for the moment). Notions of ‘emancipation’ in education are part
of the European Enlightenment, at least in the more progressive versions of that
inheritance. So the initial pedagogy is already very differently politicised. On the one
hand, the expectation of an autonomous and independent learner, facilitated by
a kind of learning that is based on dialogue, discussion and difference. ‘Education’
rather than instruction. On the other hand, a search for deﬁnition, certainty, proce-
dures, authority. Of course, ‘on the one hand’/’on the other hand’ sets up too deﬁnite
a distinction: Things never divide that neatly, but we’ll shortly take one extreme
and explore a theory of educational relationship that Rancie`re argues (Davis, 2010,
p. 25–35). It relates to our data.
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Only the Lonely
These were some common feelings amongst the international students in the group:
‘I enjoy the modern life but sometimes I feel so lonely’
‘I still need more local friends to help me to get to know the country better’
‘being lonely without my family and friends’
‘being a lone mother’
‘ﬁnding friends to discuss things’
Loneliness was a nested experience. First there was the core loneliness of doing
a PhD – a long, hard, difﬁcult, solo performance. Adding to that sense of isolation
is the perceived uncertainty of success. Surrounding that core loneliness is the
isolation of the ‘doctoral silo’: you get to know very few other staff in the faculty.
Then there was the feeling of not understanding how everyday things worked in the
UK, such as the need for a TV licence. Opinion was divided on whether Liverpool
was a friendly place. Another form of loneliness. Some found their compatriots
(Malaysian, Chinese) for company and also for what was called a ‘cycle assistance’
(cycle of assistance) whereby those who had been here a while could explain hous-
ing, car purchase, driving in England, visa requirements, the weather, etc., to the
newcomers. A ﬁnal form of loneliness was created by a British government and
university bureaucracy which seemed continuously suspicious and required reas-
surance that you really were a proper student by asking for conﬁrmation with
paranoid regularity.3
Not all of the group agreed with the lonely theme – for themselves, that is. Irish
and Scottish agreed that Liverpool was ‘the easiest of all the cities I have ever lived to
ﬁt in’, and loneliness for the international students (most of whom were female) also
meant an important new experience of independence. Like all expatriates, they
learned to look at their identity in different ways, partly by recognising ‘imagined
communities’ (Anderson, 1983) and partly by redeﬁning themselves across their new
identities and experiences. They had to cope, catch buses, order taxis, shop, work –
all without the familiar supports of an extended family. One student felt that she
would come out of the experience glad to get home but also stronger for the expe-
rience. An article on being an American father in Norway, with a Norwegian wife and
kids, pointed out at least the hope that, following Nietzsche (1882), the children
would of course become Norwegian in terms of their identity but still able to look
at being Norwegian from an outside perspective as well. Nietzsche called this a
‘suspecting glance’ (Miller, 2013).
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Towards a Theory of ‘Rude’
Generally, the group felt a heightened sense of personal responsibility across both
living and learning. ‘I have responsibility to do everything’, ‘I have to accept whatever
obstacles’, ‘I have to survive’. When we discussed this theme, someone said that one
of the very difﬁcult things was reading and reading again – maybe 10 times, and still
not understanding. As Dung wrote:
Though I got IETLS 7.0 [test score for English as Additional Language] I didn’t
understand anything after days of reading a book. I kept reading. The more I
read, the more I felt upset and just wanted to quit. I didn’t think I was clever
enough to keep moving toward.
This reminded me of something I had recently been reading. Rancie`re discusses
the work of Joseph Jacotot, who spoke only French, yet taught students who spoke
only Flemish. This was at the University of Leuven in 1818. Jacotot made them recite
the opening lines of a book written in French and ‘when they had reached the middle
of the ﬁrst book, he made them repeat what they had read over and over again and
then read the rest of the volume’ (Davis, 2010, p. 25). Jacotot was ‘astonished’ to ﬁnd
that when required later to write about what they had read, they did so better than
native French speakers. He concluded that ‘explanation’ stood in the way of learning,
a theme Rancie`re develops. Ordinary pedagogy installs a permanent dependence on
the learner, an ‘intellectual inequality of teacher and student’ (p. 12). As Davis notes,
‘Far better results could be obtained by presupposing from the outset that the stu-
dents were the intellectual equals of each other and their teacher’ (p. 26). Rancie`re
calls this ‘radical equality’ and takes it to be a ‘presupposition’ of real learning. The
student becomes autonomous from the beginning, rather than working towards it.
The institution in its very structures is condemned to be hierarchical and oppressive:
It generates the dependence that guarantees its professed aims of ‘equality’ or even
‘autonomy’ will be endlessly deferred. Now, it’s only a theory, and the question is how
convincingly can we connect the theory to our empirical references? Let’s try to do
that just to see how we can develop such links and also begin to see what a theory
looks like and can and can’t do – addressing this concern: ‘In Vietnam, in my
research area, there is no ‘‘theory’’ like that. I was very confused about that’.
What are the connections for us, in this group, in these (for most) early stages of
our doctoral work? First there is the empirical parallel: reading and reading and
reading, not understanding, and then – ﬁnally and hopefully – understanding. It’s
not so far away from Jacotot’s ‘reciting’. Second there is the parallel in language.
DECONSTRUCTING INTERCULTURAL LEARNING 391
This content downloaded from 
              94.119.96.1 on Wed, 02 Oct 2019 08:48:16 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Knowing English but not well enough to feel competent at doctoral-level intellectual
tasks; there is a ﬂavour of the French/Flemish incomprehension there. Third, there is
the remedy of a sort of ‘radical equality’: The doctoral group is, I think, the only one
in the country (in education at least) where the group publishes before its members
complete their doctorates (Frankham et al., 2014; Stronach et al., 2013) and which
acts together as a thinking group, rather than stays in its ‘doctoral silo’. Fourth, there
is an attempt at breaking the hierarchies of institutionalised knowledge that Jacotot
and Rancie`re criticised, which takes us back to the business of calling the ‘Professor’,
‘Mark’. And so learning to be ‘rude’!
The analytic memo for this part of our work ended like this: ‘Conclusion: You can
only start at the end’.
Deconstructing Research Pedagogy in Qualitative Research
We proposed at the start of this article that we would attempt a ‘dialectical tacking’
between the intellectual problems of intercultural understanding in a doctoral con-
text and some experiential dilemmas. We further address in this section the intel-
lectual problems of understanding the unfamiliar. As Bull (2011) notes, ‘reading like
a loser means assimilating a text in such a way that it is incompatible with one’s self’
(p. 36). I want to pick up on Jacotot’s weird pedagogical suggestion – that we can
somehow understand through endless repetition, even when we don’t understand the
language of instruction. Rancie`re called it, you may recall, a ‘radical pedagogy’ (as
cited in Blanchot, 1982, p. 25), and I tried to use that kind of theorising as a way of
making sense of our problems in understanding across language, gender, culture,
religion and age. To add to what was earlier written on Rancie`re’s thinking, he argues
that what conventional pedagogy does is to offer a kind of stultiﬁcation (¼ a making
stupid) of the learner’s intelligence. Learners are constantly reminded of the expert’s
superior knowledge, so what is ‘learned’ is a perpetual dependency and inferiority.
Yet, he claims, we share the same intelligence, noting ‘intellectual emancipation is the
veriﬁcation of the equality of intelligence’ (Rancie`re, 2009, p. 10). That intelligence
can be foregrounded and mobilised by the learner as a ‘poetic labour of translation’
(p. 10). He addresses the traditional ‘myth of pedagogy’ (Davis, 2010, p. 26) with an
‘anarchist scepticism’ (p. 25). What must be eroded is the learner as passive, inactive,
distant from the learning, waiting to be instructed out of his or her ignorance:
These oppositions – viewing/knowing, appearance/reality, activity/passivity –
are quite different from logical oppositions between clearly deﬁned terms. They
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speciﬁcally deﬁne a distribution of the sensible, an a priori distribution of the
positions, and capacities and incapacities attached to these positions. They are
embodied allegories of inequality. (Rancie`re, 2009, p. 12)
But what about writing itself? What kind of a difference does the act of writing, of
narrating, make to our (mis)understandings? Again, we used the following extract in
order to deconstruct some of its possibilities, thinking in front of the group.
Blanchot (1982) writes about this most peculiar of difﬁculties. You will feel like
one of Jacotot’s students when you ﬁrst read this paragraph, but let’s hope that
a ‘radical pedagogy’ can come to our rescue! Here’s what Blanchot had to say about
this sort of problem, which he calls one of ‘narrative voice’:
I write – or say – the sentence: ‘Life energy is not inexhaustible’. In doing so
I am thinking of something quite simple, of the feeling of exhaustion which
constantly reminds us of the fact that life is limited: we walk a few steps down
the road, eight, nine, and we collapse. The limits set by exhaustion limit our
lives. The signiﬁcance of life is in turn limited by this limit – the limited
signiﬁcance of a limited life. But a reversal occurs which can be perceived in
various ways. Language alters the situation. The words I speak tend to draw
into life the limits that ought to contain it. To say that life is limited does not
make the limit disappear; but language gives it the possibly limitless meaning it
is supposed to limit; the meaning of limit by stating it contradicts the limitation
of the meaning or at least displaces it. But in this way the knowledge of limit
understood as limitation of meaning may be lost. How then can we talk of limit
(convey its meaning) without the meaning un-limiting it? Here it would be
opportune to employ a different kind of language and, ﬁrst of all, admit that the
sentence: ‘Life energy, etc’ is not, as such, entirely legitimate. (p. 213)
Here is some of the thinking (out loud) that we did with each other about this
passage:
1. I have a feeling (of growing exhaustion). I name it with words that I hope
represent that feeling, honestly, accurately and completely. So I say: ‘Life
energy is not inexhaustible’. But ‘life energy’ is a concept, not at all like the
reporting of a ‘few steps’. I might have said ‘vitality’ or ‘ﬁtness’ or perhaps
I could have avoided using the negative route of ‘not in’. I might have said it
positively, ‘Life energy is exhaustible’. So every attempt at representation is
an interpretation: it is never certain. Even a ‘step’ has conceptual limits –
when is it not a shufﬂe, a totter or a jump? As I have written before,
DECONSTRUCTING INTERCULTURAL LEARNING 393
This content downloaded from 
              94.119.96.1 on Wed, 02 Oct 2019 08:48:16 UTC               
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
‘each . . . halting . . . print . . . of . . . individual . . .word . . . on . . . paper . . . inserts
and withdraws meaning, giving a ‘‘one’’ (more or less) and taking away an
‘‘inﬁnity’’ of not-said in the lop-sided arithmetic of writing’ (Stronach, 2010, p.
162).
2. But when I say ‘life energy is not inexhaustible’ I point to a double limit, the
‘feeling’ of limit, and also its ‘signiﬁcance’ – which is not the same thing
because signiﬁcance indicates ‘meaning’ rather than ‘feeling’. It is a different
‘sense’, in these two ways.
3. So the statement of ‘feeling’, given ‘signiﬁcance’ to accompany it, becomes
a kind of generalisation, a piece of cautionary wisdom, which may help
explain why it is expressed through a double negative, that is, ‘not inexhaust-
ible’. For example, I may make sense of the ‘exhaustion’ thesis by expressing
it to myself in terms I can relate to: make the act jogging, call it miles not
steps, and I can see precisely and empirically how such a ‘feeling’ may come
about. That would be a reﬂexive kind of ‘making sense’. A particularisation
rather than a generalisation would go like this: ‘My life energy is not inex-
haustible’. I can combine these two versions of the statement by arguing that
if I am human, and all humans have energy which runs out in a similar way,
then I can take my own case, with its merely singular claim to truth, and offer
it as a naturalistic generalisation, a more or less universal truth.
4. Then Blanchot (1982) takes a linguistic turn: ‘The words I speak tend to draw
into life the limits that ought to contain it’ (p. 214). What can he mean?Well,
here’s one possibility. Life is made up of events. Events are recorded in
words. It seems thereby that the active is made passive, the temporary made
permanent. We may take ‘a few steps’, but words can’t. They sit still on the
page. But Blanchot says otherwise: ‘Language gives it [life] the possibly lim-
itless meaning it is supposed to limit’ (p. 379).
5. So Blanchot (1982) claims to have found a paradox about language in its very
being, which he calls a kind of ‘neutrality’ later in the argument. Words are
never limited to attempts at representation. They are also a performance.
This performativity is active, part of the world, an unavoidable violation of
the ‘limits’ of what words ought to be doing. A rather too simple illustration:
Think of the difference between saying ‘This ship is called Queen Mary’ and
‘I name this ship Queen Mary’ (Austin, 1962). The ﬁrst statement offers an
empirical and contingent truth (which will be wrong if the ship is actually
called Floppsie). The second makes something happen: It is the word as
event.
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6. Blanchot (1982) concludes by arguing that the statement ‘life energy is not
inexhaustible’ is ‘not, as such, entirely legitimate’ (p. 184). ‘Legitimate’ means
lawful, permitted, correct. In its original meaning, it means ‘(of a child) born
of parents lawfully married to each other’ (Concise Oxford). What narratives
try to do is to marry off events to appropriate words and to give birth to
legitimate ‘children’ of meaning and representation. But in Blanchot’s view,
the marriage never quite comes off, though the babies come thick and fast.
And that’s why writing is always a bit of a bastard.
We’ve looked at some of our intellectual challenges within the group and also at the
experiences which accompany them, both in the group and as a ‘foreign’ student in
Liverpool. We’ll say more about experience in a later article, but meantime we want
to turn back on our account and consider how it might be criticised.
Decolonising Metaphor and Value: An Asian Excursion
Concerning ‘White PhDs’
Thus far, we have looked at an aspect of linguistic translation, concluding that it is
only by unearthing and thinking about differences that we can create a common
understanding. In this instance, there is no ‘master’ relationship. We equally bring
our knowledge of difference. These differences create a common understanding
beyond the reach of any individual in the group. Our second move was to make the
same attempt with a politics of pedagogy, constructing a reﬂexive understanding of
what we variously take doctoral learning and teaching to be about. Thus we add
helpful uncertainty within the disjunctions of difference. Then we located problems
of language and pedagogy in a broader existential ﬁeld, which we conceptualised as
the nested ‘loneliness’ of the international student in a strange country. Alienation
joined uncertainty and disjunction. We sought to redress those various forms of
estrangement with Rancie`re’s notion of ‘radical equality’ and ‘intellectual emancipa-
tion’ (Rancie`re, 1991), though we would want to temper that ‘equality’ in the manner
suggested by Badiou (2012): ‘The axiom of the equality of intelligences is far from
constituting an axiom of the equality of opinions’ (p. 16).
Now that may still seem a far too utopian ambition, one which disguises a fairly
obvious ventriloquising equality as well as an unacknowledged Eurocentrism con-
tained in the very rhetorics of equality and emancipation. Our defence would be that,
as the ‘Thi’ example showed, we are trying in this exercise to think in front of each
other so that the thinking, and the writing, become visible, shared and open to
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challenge. In other words, experiential. Each of these differences, therefore, opens up
the possibility of a common understanding.
If we were to criticise some of our earlier thinking about intercultural doctoral
learning, what could we say? First of all, there are, as we noted, invocations of
‘equality’ that obscure obvious inequalities of experience, status and authorship. Are
these gestures towards ‘equality’ anything better than a form of ‘indirect rule’? Is the
collaboration real or illusory? Then again, if we look at the apparent emphasis on
‘equality’, we can recognise a European Enlightenment theme, carried from the
French Revolution by Jacotot, and then Rancie`re, and then the ‘Western’ lead authors
of this piece (see also Badiou, 2012). Is it a European enlightenment dressed up as
a universal value? If so, does it say to international students: ‘Come and do a White
PhD’? The ironic notion of a ‘white PhD’ was suggested by Vanessa and referred to
how some of her peers in China responded to her doctoral ambitions in the UK. The
concept carries with it, in unspoken conspiracy, notions of ‘civilisation’, ‘order’,
‘progress’. It adds to that a kind of sovereign knowledge related to transcendental
Truths (God or King), essentially, according to Rancie`re (1991), religious in its
hierarchical appeal, ‘the framework of a theocratic and sociocratic vision of intelli-
gence’ (p. 53).
We turn now to a more adventurous attempt to reground our politics and
practices of meaning elsewhere in an experimental recourse to the history and cul-
ture of Asia, where many of the group come from.
Junger (2010) reﬂects on the unruly nature of Afghanistan, both historically and
in the present. As he puts it, ‘it’s no place for empires’ (p. 99). It is a thesis that J. C.
Scott (2009) develops at considerable length and extends to most of the uplands of
Southeast Asia. J. C. Scott’s thesis is original. He argues that we need a much more
jaundiced view of ‘Empire’ – whether Han-Chinese, Burma, Thai, various European
ones or Arab, Roman or Greek ones. They were mostly founded on slavery, or at least
authoritarian subjection. In Asia they centred on ‘wet-rice’ cultivation and were
lowland ‘padi states’ (p. 79). The people were enclosed, made sedentary, taxable and
controllable. The state sought to homogenize them, ‘to integrate and monetize the
peoples, lands and resources of the periphery so that they become, to use the French
term, rentable – auditable contributors to the gross national product and to foreign
exchange’ (p. 4). They were made ‘legible’, measurable and hence taxable. Such
‘extractive’ empires (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 124) envisaged themselves as
models of ‘civilisation’, with ‘progress’ as their major conceit. The ‘civilizational
discourse’ involved separating the ‘cooked’ from the ‘raw’ (as the Han-Chinese had
it) and representing hill people as ‘wild’ (p. 116), primitive barbarians who belonged
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to ‘tribes’ that reﬂected their inferior development. Such was the ‘tunnel vision of the
court-state view’ (p. 36). J. C. Scott argues that this ‘civilizational discourse’ (p. 98)
invented the nonstate peoples as ‘archaic remnants’ in order to justify attempts at
‘enclosure’ and incorporation in the state. The Han-Chinese had three categories of
assimilation –‘min, cooked barbarian, raw barbarian’ (p. 123). If we deploy this
narrative as an analogous resource, we can ask different questions: As international
students, is the implication that we’re learning to be ‘cooked barbarians’? Or, as
a Chinese participant in this group put it, becoming ‘bananas’ (yellow on the outside,
white underneath)?
According to J. C. Scott (2009), the historical and anthropological record can be
read very differently. A ‘wild’ status often reﬂected a ‘ﬂight from the state’. Some
became oral cultures when previously they had had writing. These were deliberate
ploys to remain ungovernable, either through the altitude at which they lived or via
their shifting patterns of cultivation or settlement. Their social processes involved
‘shape-shifting, ﬁssioning, disaggregation’ (p. 219) while their identities were formed
in something much more like a ‘bricolage’ (p. 233). They tended to have social goals
that involved ‘equality, autonomy, mobility’ and this was reﬂected even in the culti-
vation of crops, as for example, cassava rather than rice. J. C. Scott refers to all such
peoples/groups in Southeast Asia as belonging to a new term, ‘Zomia’, a nonstate
space determined not by geographical boundaries so much as by altitude, remote-
ness, desert and disafﬁliation. He notes that such contrasting dynamics could his-
torically be found elsewhere – Arabs/Berbers, Scots/English,4 Albanian/Greek,
Cossacks/Russian and so on.
Such a ‘Zomiac’ analogy helps us to decolonise the imperial pretensions of this
account, which draws too much on Enlightenment values (the rhetoric of empires)
and to consider instead the insurgent and oppositional nature of these values as a set
of practices outside imperial rule and rhetoric. Thus we can challenge one of the
fantasies of the ‘West’ – that of a ‘monopoly of the universal’ (Debray, 2013, p. 32)
part of its ‘delusions of grandeur’ (p. 37). A bit too much of a ‘just-so’ story, as J. C.
Scott puts it (2009, p. 335). And there is a theoretical literature that develops such
themes, such as the nomadology of Deleuze and Guattari (1986) and the ‘Empire’ of
global capitalism identiﬁed by Hardt and Negri (2000). It is, incidentally, striking how
close in his conceptualisations J.C. Scott comes to the language and concepts of such
theorists – yet there is nothing in his references to indicate a direct link as opposed to
a parallel kind of thinking about ‘difference’.
Empire was also a matter of classiﬁcation, deﬁnition, quantiﬁcation and audit. It
had its own distinctive and enclosing ways of thinking, measuring and recording. In
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contrast, J. C. Scott (2009) posited a ‘Zomia’ that was open, ﬂuid, indeﬁnable, portable
and oral.5 It takes only a little epistemological imagination to see in such an empire
and its contradiction a paradigm conﬂict between a quantiﬁed social science and its
more fugitive alternatives in qualitative inquiry. Current audit mania seeks to make
the social entirely ‘legible’ in J. C. Scott’s sense. That would take us to a happy ending
in terms of a resistance to commodiﬁcation, though it would be wrong not to note
that J. C. Scott sees ‘Zomia’ as currently coming to an end. We are witnessing, he
concludes, ‘the world’s last great enclosure’ (p. 282). That is a political claim that is
perhaps a little premature. There seems to be plenty ‘wild’ places left, if we take
a more malign view of that condition – say Somalia, Congo, Afghanistan, Syria. But
can we be sure – analogously – that it is also a premature epistemological claim?
There is much in contemporary educational and social research in the ‘West’ to
suggest just such a ‘last great enclosure’ (Stronach, Clarke, & Frankham, 2014). In
which case we need to be clear: We need more anarchy, not the chaos of more order.
Postscript (But Not Really)
It would be deceptive to say that we have been rehearsing forms of research thinking
and writing, since performance precedes rehearsal, after our musings on Jacotot and
Rancie`re. Finally, we want to enact an end to this writing, again in front of itself, as an
object for future thinking. This piece of course came out of the port of Liverpool, and
we want it to end there while acknowledging that it can’t ‘end’ anywhere. The
problem is this: Narratives end in false closure (it is rude to stop in the middle of
a sentence). Yet telling the ‘story’ of method (a form of enclosure) is always unra-
velled by the ‘method’ of story (a form of dis-closure). Calvino (2009) – in the surreal
science of ‘Solar Storm’ – offers a narrative of galactic chaos in relation to Earthly
conceits about cause and effect: The Sun mocks Earth’s certainties, and yet we are
compelled to end our self-storying with attempts to make ourselves ‘safe from the
maelstrom of chaotic elements whirling around us’ (p. 350). In ‘Solar Storm’, the
narrator travels home within science, on the good ship Halley, as a captain, a navi-
gator, a predictor of positions in the surety of Earth’s regularities. But he gets lost in
magnetic storms generated by the Sun; they disrupt his communications, make his
compass fail and his crew panic. As a doctoral group also sailing to and from Liver-
pool, the place of our estrangement, we can empathise with these metaphorical
failures of direction and place. We have enacted getting lost – ethnically, experien-
tially and even potentially, for the last future is the educational bit. Yet, with Calvino,
our narrative deﬁes the chaos and insists on a certain illusory closure:
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Our route is certain, the sea is calm, tomorrow we will be in sight of the familiar
Welsh coast, and in two days we will enter the tarry Mersey estuary, and cast
anchor in the port of Liverpool, the end of our voyage. (p. 350)
Notes
1. Bellos (2012) notes that ‘this problem does not arise in German where ‘‘man’’ is either
‘‘Mensch’’ (meaning humankind) or ‘‘Mann’’ (male)’ (p. 206). J. C. Scott (2009) notes that
‘interestingly, but not signiﬁcantly, ‘‘man’’ apparently also turns up in Vietnamese, where it
means ‘‘savage’’!’ (p. 100).
2. Throughout this article, all ﬁrst-person references refer to the ﬁrst author, Ian Stronach.
3. At Liverpool John Moores University, international student attendance/progress was mon-
itored at six-week intervals. Such reporting involved the student and director of studies
ﬁlling in and signing a form which went ﬁrst to the university’s central bureaucracy and
thence to the UK Border Agency.
4. A more apposite contrast would be between Highland and Lowland Scots. Sir Walter Scott
did much to romanticise what he called the ‘wild people’ (W. Scott, 1814/1985, p. 124).
5. J. C. Scott’s thesis is controversial, as Hammond (2011) and others illustrate. Sadan (2013)
would add charges of overgeneralisation and romanticisation of the ‘wild’ peoples. Indeed such
romanticising of the upland peoples is a persistent literary effect, as Sir Walter Scott’s con-
struction/invention of the Scottish Highlander amply demonstrates (W. Scott, 1814/1985).
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